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Over 45 years ago, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that students have free speech rights in school.' In a
few cases since then, the Court has modified the jurisprudence in
ways that do not make it clearer but, instead, more obscure and
more difficult to apply.2 The circuit courts have tried to take
account of the Court's changing views and have come up with
very different and sometimes incompatible ways to apply the
doctrine.3 Until the United States Supreme Court offers a
coherent analysis of the existing jurisprudence that offers
guidance on several issues on which there is a split, lower courts
will continue to offer increasingly incompatible interpretations
of the jurisprudence-they will issue decisions that are
increasingly at odds with each other and which, considered
together, will increasingly undermine good public policy and the
perception that the law treats individuals fairly and consistently.
Part I provides an account of the Court's jurisprudence
regarding student speech rights, highlighting ways in which the
doctrine has become increasingly obscure. Part II examines
attempts made by the circuit courts to make sense of the doctrine,
explaining some of the surprising implications of these
interpretations. The piece concludes that the current
jurisprudence, as articulated by the Court, allows the exceptions
to swallow the rule in many cases, which results in inconsistent
holdings across the circuits and an incomprehensible doctrine.
I. STUDENT FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
The Court first recognized student expression rights in the
context of a silent protest of the Vietnam War.4 While the Court
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3 See infra notes 206-336 and accompanying text.
4 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
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laid out some of the parameters of the doctrine, those parameters
nonetheless needed fleshing out. Regrettably, the subsequent
jurisprudence obscures rather than clarifies the existing doctrine,
leaving the existing parameters in doubt and offering less rather
than more guidance about how to handle the increasingly varied
and confusing cases that the lower courts must decide.
A. Tinker
Many commentators argue that Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District represents the high point of
First Amendment freedom for students,' although some suggest
that the opinion is not so readily characterized that way.' The
case involved two high school students and one junior high
school student' who were suspended because they wore black
' Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children's Rights "Collide": Free Speech vs. the Right
to Be Let Alone in the Context of OffCampus "Cyber-Bullying", 81 Miss. L.J. 189, 195
(2011) (noting that Tinker "has been extolled as the 'zenith of children's rights"');
Patrick E. Mcdonough, Where Good Intentions Go Bad: Redrafting the Massachusetts
Cyberbullying Statute to Protect Student Speech, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 627, 635 (2013)
(" Tinker represents the high-water mark for the Court's protection of students'
constitutional rights under the First Amendment."); Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing
SchoolAuthority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 623, 636 (2002)
(describing " Tinker as the touchstone case supporting public school students' First
Amendment rights."); Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense ofthe "Hazardous Freedom "of
Controversial Student Speech, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1501, 1506 (2008) ("The high water
point for students' First Amendment rights came in the first case directly on the
question that the Supreme Court decided."); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech
Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (2008) (discussing "the robust
vision of student speech rights it embraced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District").
6 Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Uncertainty at the "Outer Boundaries" of the First Amendment:
Extending the Arm of SchoolAuthority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST.
JOHN'S J. C.R. & ECoN. DEV. 731, 758 (2010) (" Tinker strikes the appropriate balance
between school authority and students' First Amendment rights in Internet student
speech cases."); Matthew Sheffield, Stop with the Exceptions: A Narrow Interpretation of
TinkerforAll Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETMcs J. 175, 179
(2011) ("The Court's majority opinion in Tinker seems almost schizophrenic, as it
shifts from a narrow holding based on the facts of the case, to making broad
proclamations about First Amendment rights.").
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 ("Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner
Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa.
Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John's sister, was a 13-year-old student in junior high
school.").
2
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armbands to school protesting the Vietnam War.' The Court
made clear that the expression at issue implicated First
Amendment guarantees.' Wearing an armband "was closely
akin to 'pure speech' which . . . is entitled to comprehensive
protection under the First Amendment."" Further, the Court
rejected that this form of speech disrupted the educational
process in this particular case.11
Tinker is widely quoted for the recognition that students
have First Amendment rights.1 2 "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."" That
said, however, the Court also recognized the need for school
authorities to maintain control in the educational setting. 14
"[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools."" The question
before the Court was how to reconcile the competing interests
'Id. ("On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their
schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and
suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands.").
' See id. at 505 ("[T]he wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain
views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.") (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)).
10 Id. at 505-06 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)).
" Id. at 505 ("[T]he wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was
entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those
participating in it.").
12 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Bradley, Adjusting the Law to Reflect Reality: Arguing for A New
Standard for Student Internet Speech, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (2014); Sean
Radomski, We Helped Start the Fire: A College Sporting Event Incitement Standard, 14 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 278, 290 (2015); Christine Snyder, Reversing the Tide: Restoring
First Amendment Ideals in America's Schools Through Legislative Protections for Journalism
Students and Advisors, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 71, 73 (2014); Kelly-Ann Weimar, A
Picture Is Worth A Thousand Words: Tattoos and Tattooing Under the First Amendment, 7
ARiz. SUMMIT L. REV. 719, 751 (2014).
13 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
14 William Bush, What You Sign Up for: Public University Restrictions on "Professional"
Student Speech After Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTs.
& Soc. JUST. 547, 554 (2014) ("While Tinker laid a strong baseline for student free
speech in public schools, the Court emphasized that students' free speech rights are
cabined by the legitimate interests of schools.").
15 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
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when they appeared to conflict,"6 although the Court implied that
the conflict was more apparent than real. "There is here no
evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent,
with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone." 17 Instead, the school
officials punished these students for "a silent, passive expression
of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on
the part of petitioners."
The school officials did not know how the other students
would react to the wearing of armbands and were arguably
taking prudent prophylactic action by suspending the protesting
students.19 However, the Supreme Court made clear that the
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."20
When suggesting that the fear of disturbance did not
alone justify abridging expression guarantees, the Court did not
make clear what would justify such an abridgement. The Court
noted that "[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble[] [and] [a]ny variation from the majority's opinion
may inspire fear,"2 1 implying that one must expect that
dissenting views will cause discomfort.22 The Court explained
that "[a]ny word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance,"23 and that "our
Constitution says we must take this risk." 24
Risk of what? Is speech protected only if there is no
reaction to it? The Court was unwilling to go so far. Instead, in
16 See id. ("Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First
Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.").
11 Id. at 508.
18 Id.
19 Id. ("The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was




22 See Elizabeth M. Jaffe & Robert J. D'Agostino, Bullying in Public Schools: The
Intersection Between the Student's Free Speech Rights and the School's Duty to Protect, 62
MERCER L. REv. 407, 423 (2011) (" Tinker requires more than an apprehension of
disturbance or a desire to avoid discomfort associated with an unfavorable
viewpoint.").
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order for the state to be justified in punishing students for their
protected speech, the state had "to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." 25 Where there was "no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the
prohibition cannot be sustained." 26 Not only was there no
finding of such interference below,27 the Court's "independent
examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students." 28 Instead,
the Court inferred that the school authorities' action was "based
upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result
from the expression, even by the silent symbol of armbands, of
opposition to this Nation's part in the conflagration in
Vietnam." 29 The school authorities actions were even more
suspect because they "did not purport to prohibit the wearing of
all symbols of political or controversial significance." 3 0 For
example, "students in some of the schools wore buttons relating
to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron
Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism."3 1
The Tinker Court rejected that school authorities "possess
absolute authority over their students."3 2 Instead, "[s]tudents in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution ... [who] possess[] ... fundamental rights which
2 5 Id. at 509.
26 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). See also Allison
E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme
Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the CyberAge, 43 AKRON L. REv. 247, 252
(2010) (" Tinker sets a very high standard: a student's speech must 'materially and
substantially interfere' with the school's administrative order to be prohibited.").
27 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("In the present case, the District Court made no such
finding.").
28 Id
2 9 Id. at 510.
30 Id.
3 1 Id.
3 2 Id. at 511.
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the State must respect."" Further, "personal
intercommunication among the students . . . [itself is] an
important part of the educational process." 34 This means that
"[w]hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, ... [the student] may
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam."" That does not mean that students are free
to prevent the school from performing its basic functions. The
student may speak as long as she "does so without 'materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without
colliding with the rights of others." " That said, however,
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason-whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.37
When discussing student behavior inside and outside of
class, the Court did not make clear whether the Tinker analysis
should also be applied to off-campus conduct after school hours
or was instead limited to conduct that was under the auspices of
the school. Regrettably, the Court never clarified in the
subsequent case law the conditions under which a school could
reach off-campus behavior not under school auspices."
The Tinker Court interpreted the Constitution to provide
substantial protection for student speech. Neither probable nor
actual harm will justify the punishment of student speech unless
that harm is substantial.39 In the case before the Court, "no
disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact
occurred"40 and, further, the record did not contain "any facts
3 3 Id.
3 4 d. at 512.
35 Id. at 512-13.
36 Id. at 513 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
37 Id. (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
38 See infra notes 53-206 and accompanying text (discussing other Supreme Court
school expression cases).
39 See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work ofthe Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 1269, 1338 (1991) ("Tinker ... requires a showing of
either a material or substantial disruption of the school's work or harm to students.").
40 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
6
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities."4 1 Precisely because of the lack of such evidence, the
Tinker Court saw no need to specify what would count as a
sufficient disturbance to justify punishment; however, Justice
Black in his dissent noted some of the disturbances contained in
the record that together failed to meet the Court's implicit
standard.42 For example, the "armbands caused comments,
warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a
warning by an older football player that other, nonprotesting
students had better let them alone."4 3 Further, one mathematics
teacher testified that "his lesson period [was] practically
'wrecked' chiefly by disputes with Mary Beth Tinker, who wore
her armband for her 'demonstration."'4 4 Thus, the Court implied
that stimulating discussion in classrooms that veered from the
planned content for the day would not alone suffice to establish
that students had substantially disrupted school activities.4 5
The majority opinion was open to at least two
interpretations: (1) the loss of one mathematics class failed to
qualify as a substantial disruption46 or (2) while the loss of a class
could constitute a substantial disruption, in this case the teacher
himself decided to change the focus of the lesson that day to turn
41 Id. See also Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students'Religious Speech and Viewpoint
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 201-02 (2007) ("The test for which Tinkeris
well-known and oft-cited is that student speech may be restricted if ... such
interference is reasonably anticipated by school officials.").
42 See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
43 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
44 Id.
45 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Surprisingly, some have not appreciated this aspect of
Tinker. See Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public Schools' Authority to Discipline
Students' OffCampus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 181, 207-08 (2011) ("Lower courts have found material and substantial
disruption where student speech disturbs or distracts classroom teaching or lesson
plans. Indeed, proof of such disturbance or distraction would almost certainly have
won for the school district in Tinker itself."); Reesa Miles, Defamation Is More Than Just
A Tort: A New Constitutional Standard for Internet Student Speech, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.
J. 357, 361-62 (2013) ("While the armbands may have caused discussion outside the
classroom, they did not interfere with the classroom itself"); Emily Gold Waldman,
Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech,
60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 69 (2008) ("Although the armbands had caused 'discussion outside
of the classrooms,' they had [not] disrupted class work.").
46 Cf Lisa C. Connolly, Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools-Are Anti-Bullying Statutes the
Solution?, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 248, 269 (2012) (" Tinker appears to set a stringent bar for
a finding of substantial disruption.").
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the wearing of an armband into a teachable moment.4 7 If indeed
the teacher himself decided that the armband presented an
opportunity to digress in a way that would benefit the students,
then the change in the curriculum that day should not be
attributed to the student but instead to the teacher who (perhaps
wisely) decided to take advantage of an opportunity to discuss
important events.4 8 Allowing a teacher to react to a student's
passive expression and thereby convert it into punishable
expression would permit the teacher to employ a heckler's veto.49
School personnel should not be permitted to exercise such a veto
if students have robust speech rights." That said, however, it
might be necessary to prohibit certain expression where, for
example, there is ample reason to believe that permitting
students to wear certain clothing would result in fights, injuries,
or deaths."
4 Cf Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The NeedforA Viewpoint Neutrality
Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 217, 264 (2004) ("To
the extent that controversial speech interferes with those objectives, teachers and
administrators should take the opportunity to engage students in dialogue and consider
each controversy a 'teachable moment."').
48 Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with
Teachers' First Amendment Rights, Time for A New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 1285,
1286-87 (2009) (discussing how Tinker provided a great example of a teachable
moment for several different reasons).
49 Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker's Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L.
REv. 1129, 1145 (2009) ("[T]he decision in Tinker led to a series of difficult and
problematic questions including . .. the role of the so-called heckler's veto in assessing
the level of actual or anticipated disruption."); John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint
Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REv. 569, 579 (2009) ("[F]orty years of applying Tinker
have not made clear the degree to which Tinker allows schools to engage in a heckler's
veto."); R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist
Alternative, 41 IND. L. REv. 105, 112-13 (2008) (discussing "credible threats of
altercations and disorder under the alternative Tinker 'disruption' prong"); R. George
Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2 n.11 (2014) ("Whether Tinker, in
contrast, allows for a 'heckler's veto' by opponents of the actual or proposed speech. .
. is worthy of reflection.").
5o Cf Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510 (discussing the Tinker Court's refusal to permit school
authorities to censor some but not other controversial speech); see supra notes 36-38,
and accompanying text.
51 See Alison M. Barbarosh, Undressing the First Amendment in Public Schools: Do Uniform
Dress Codes Violate Students'First Amendment Rights?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1415, 1418-
19 (1995) ("One popular approach taken across the country has been the adoption of
dress codes that prohibit students from wearing gang-related apparel at school."). But
cf Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub nom. Dariano ex rel. M.D. v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1700
(2015) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("It is this bedrock principle-known as the
heckler's veto doctrine-that the panel overlooks, condoning the suppression of free
speech by some students because other students might have reacted violently.").
B. Exceptions to Tinker
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser5 2 provides a
counterweight to Tinker." At issue was "whether the First
Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a high
school student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly."5 4
Matthew Fraser gave a nomination speech at a student assembly
where he "referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.""
Discussing student reactions to the speech, a school
counselor explained that "[s]ome students hooted and yelled;
some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities
pointedly alluded to in respondent's speech[, while still] [o]ther
students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the
speech.""6 The day after the speech, the Assistant Principal
summoned Fraser to her office,57 telling him that the school
considered the speech a violation of school policy." The school
policy Fraser violated read as follows: "Conduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures." 59 His speech was determined to be
obscene, at least for purposes of that policy."o He was eventually
suspended for two days."1
Fraser challenged the punishment in federal court.62 The
district court held that the school had violated Fraser's First
52 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
53 Jeremy Jorgensen, Student Rights Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court's Clouded Judgment
in Morse v. Frederick, 25 TOuRO L. REv. 739, 747 (2009) ("Reversing the lower courts,
the Supreme Court abandoned Tinker's substantial disruption test and held that
censoring the student's sexually insinuative speech did not contravene the First
Amendment."); Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive,
Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 97, 100
(2010) ("Fraser is an exception to Tinker because it did not overrule Tinker and allows
a school to regulate student speech, even absent a substantial disruption.").
54 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
5 Id. at 677-78.




'0 Id. at 679 ("The examiner determined that the speech fell within the ordinary
meaning of 'obscene,' as used in the disruptive-conduct rule .....
61 Id.
62 Id. ("Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then brought this action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.").
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Amendment rights,63 a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.6 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed. "
While acknowledging Tinker's holding that students
retain First Amendment rights,66 the Fraser Court noted the
"marked distinction between the political 'message' of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's
speech." 6 7 The Court explained that "[t]he undoubted freedom
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior."" After all, students must learn to keep
their audience in mind.6 9 "Even the most heated political
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences."70
After acknowledging the right of adults to express
political views in offensive terms,71 the Fraser Court explained
that children do not have that same robust First Amendment
right in school.7 2 Permitting the kind of speech employed by
Fraser might have undermined the ability of the school to impart
civic virtue. "The schools . . . may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school
63 Id. ("The District Court held that the school's sanctions violated respondent's right
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
64 d. ("The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
District Court .....
65 Id. at 680.
66 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 ("This Court acknowledged in Tinkerv. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist. . . . that students do not 'shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."') (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
6 7 Id.
681 d. at 681.
61 Cf Paul J. Beard II & Robert Luther III, A Superintendent's Guide to Student Free
Speech in California Public Schools, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 381, 396 (2008)
("First Amendment protection over student speech would turn in large part, not on
the message as objectively read or heard, but on the reactions of the message's
readers or hearers.").
70 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
71 Id. at 682 ("A sharply divided Court upheld the right to express an antidraft
viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens.") (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
72 Id. ("It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form
of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a
political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.").
that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech."7 3
When discussing why the school's action passed
constitutional muster, the Court focused on "the obvious
concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in
loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a captive
audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd
speech. "7 The Court also discussed its recognition of "an interest
in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive
spoken language." 75 The Court concluded that "[t]he First
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech ... would
undermine the school's basic educational mission."7 6
While the Fraser opinion was clear that the speech was
not protected, the opinion was less clear about why that was so.77
Perhaps it was because the speech caused some disturbance at
the school78 or perhaps because the Court believed the speech to
be outside of First Amendment protection.79 Insofar as schools
may punish any speech that might be thought to undermine their
mission," the schools would have been granted a robust power
to limit speech."
73 Id. at 683.
7 Id. at 684 (alteration in original).
7 Id.
76 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. See also Sarah Tope Reise, "Just Say No"to Pro-Drug and
Alcohol Student Speech: The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech
Promoting Drug andAlcohol Use, 57 EMoRY L.J. 1259, 1267 (2008) ("[Tlhe Court held
that the First Amendment does not protect a student's use of vulgar, offensive, lewd,
or obscene language in school.").
7 Jonathan Pyle, Speech in Public Schools: Diferent Context or Diferent Rights?, 4 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 586, 596-97 (2002) ("[Tlhe Court decided Bethel School District v. Fraser,
upholding a high school's suspension of a student for giving a speech laden with
sexual innuendo at an official high school assembly. Separating the dicta from the
holding of this opinion is difficult.") (footnote omitted).
7 But see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I dissent from the Court's
decision, however, because in my view the School District failed to demonstrate that
respondent's remarks were indeed disruptive.").
7
'But see id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (" [D]espite the Court's
characterizations, the language respondent used is far removed from the very narrow
class of 'obscene' speech which the Court has held is not protected by the First
Amendment.") (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
'o See Maureen Sullivan, Democratic Values in a Digitized World: Regulating Internet
Speech in Schools to Further the Educational Mission, 96 MARQ. L. REv. 689, 728 (2012)
("In order to uphold its educational mission, a school needs to be able to use its
discretion to limit speech that is damaging to that objective.").
" See Adam K. Nalley, Did Student Speech Get Thrown Out with the Banner? Reading
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" Narrowly to Uphold Important Constitutional Protections for Students,
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The Court noted that Fraser's language had been found
obscene for purposes of the school policy,8 2 and that obscenity
falls outside of First Amendment protection." But, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in his concurring opinion, the language
used by Fraser did not count as obscenity for First Amendment
purposes,84 which made it somewhat difficult to tell exactly what
the Court was saying or implying.
There is yet another difficulty posed in the opinion. The
school policy noted that language that materially and
substantially interfered with the educational process was
prohibited, including the use of obscene language." But that
means that someone using inappropriate language would meet
the material and substantial disruption standard, even if no one
batted an eyelash or modified a lesson plan one iota in response
to that language." However, in Fraser, a teacher testified that she
had modified her lesson plan the day after the speech,8 7 despite
losing only a portion of the class." This meant that more class
time was lost as a result of the armband in Tinker than the speech
46 Hous. L. REv. 615, 637 (2009) ("The educational mission argument has the
potential to dangerously limit student speech in many ... areas.") (footnote
omitted); see also Jordan Blair Woods, Morse v. Frederick's New Perspective on Schools'
Basic Educational Missions and the Implications for Gay-Straight Alliance First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 281, 299 (2008) ("[Alfter Tinker, the
Supreme Court increasingly granted schools authority to limit student expression
that violated their self-defined basic educational missions.").
82 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
83 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) ("[O]bscenity is not expression
protected by the First Amendment.") (footnote omitted).
84 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
* See id. at 678 (majority opinion).
6 See id. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Based on the findings of fact made by the
District Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not show 'that
the speech had a materially disruptive effect on the educational process."') (citing
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 675
(1986)). See also Clay Calvert, Mixed Messages, Muddled Meanings, Drunk Dicks, and
Boobies Bracelets: Sexually Suggestive Student Speech and the Need to Overrule or Radically
Refashion Fraser, 90 DENV. U. L. REv. 131, 134 (2012) ("Under Fraser, a message
determined to possess a sexual connotation can be permissibly punished despite the
absence of any evidence suggesting it will have even the slightest disruptive effect
among the student body."); Kevin W. Saunders, Hate Speech in the Schools: A Potential
Change in Direction, 64 ME. L. REv. 165, 173 (2011) ("Whatever approach Fraser
employed, it certainly did not conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed
by Tinker.") (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007)).
" Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 ("One teacher reported that on the day following the
speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in
order to discuss the speech with the class.").
8 8 Id.
in Fraser.8 9
Fraser might be read to carve out an exception for
indecent speech, especially when directed at minors.9 But the
Fraser Court emphasized the offensiveness of the speech at
issue,9 and offensive speech need not be lewd.92 By stating that
"lewd, indecent or offensive speech" may be punished,93 the
Court suggested that schools were not limited with respect to the
kinds of offensive speech that could be discouraged.94
That point was illustrated in a much different case. At
issue in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeie? was "the extent to
which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents
of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school's
journalism curriculum." 9 6 The student newspaper was published
roughly every three weeks97 and the practice was to submit the
proofs ahead of time to the principal for his approval.98 One issue
was submitted three days prior to the expected publication date.99
Regrettably, the principal had some concerns about two of the
articles that were to appear. 10 One article concerned student
" See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
9o Justice Mary Muehlen Maring, "Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard": Do Children
Shed Their Right to Free Speech at the Schoolhouse Gate?, 74 N.D. L. REV. 679, 685
(1998) (explaining that "Fraser's speech was vulgar and lewd, as opposed to
disruptive, and directed at a young audience"). Cf Melinda Cupps Dickler, The
Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 368
(2007) ("The Fraser Court's use of that language . . . had been limited by Fraser's
context to student speech that was vulgar or lewd."); Jacob Tabor, Students'First
Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off- Campus Cyberspeech and School
Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 566 (2009) ("At its narrowist, it [Fraser holds that in
a student assembly, a school may punish lewd and vulgar speech.").
9 See Justin T. Peterson, School Authority v. Students'First Amendment Rights: Is
Subjectivity Strangling the Free Mind at Its Source?, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 931, 936 (2005)
("According to the Court, the school serves an appropriate function of public
education by prohibiting lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech.") (citing Fraser, 478 U.S.
at 683).
92 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84 ("We have also recognized an interest in protecting
minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.").
93 Id. at 683 ("The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.").
94 Cf Tabor, supra note 91, at 566 ("At its broadest, it [Fraser] holds that schools may
punish speech that would undermine the school's educational mission as determined
by the school board.").
'"484 U.S. 260 (1988).
I6 d. at 262.
97 Id.
9
' Id. at 263.
9 Id. ("On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13 edition to Reynolds
100 Id.
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pregnancy and he feared that the identity of the students might
be ascertained, use of pseudonyms notwithstanding."o' He also
feared that the discussion of sexual activity and birth control
might not be suitable for some of the younger students.102 The
other article was problematic because it contained a student's
view of her parents' divorce and the parents had not been given
an opportunity to respond.103 In addition, he (wrongly) believed
that the student was named in the article. 104
The principal saw few options. The necessary changes
could not be made before the scheduled print runos and a
significant delay in publication would mean that the newspaper
would not be published prior to graduation.106 He decided that
the newspaper should be published as scheduled but without the
two articles requiring revision. 107
Students later challenged the principal's actions, claiming
that he had violated their First Amendment rights.o10 The district
court concluded that the principal's concern about the pregnant
girls' loss of anonymity and the accompanying invasion of
privacy "was 'legitimate and reasonable,"' 109 and that he was
justified in "shield[ing] younger students from exposure to
unsuitable material."110 The district court further held that the
article about the divorce was justifiably deleted because there
was no evidence that the parents had been consulted."' The
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. ("Reynolds believed that the student's parents should have been given an
opportunity to respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication.").
104 Id. ("He was unaware that Emerson had deleted the student's name from the final
version of the article.").
105 Id. ("Reynolds believed that there was no time to make the necessary changes in
the stories before the scheduled press run .... .").
106 Id. at 264 (" [T]he newspaper would not appear before the end of the school year if
printing were delayed to any significant extent.").
10' Id. ("[H]e directed Emerson to withhold from publication the two pages
containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce.").
10 Id. at 262 ("Respondents are three former Hazelwood East students who were
staff members of Spectrum, the school newspaper. They contend that school officials
violated their First Amendment rights .....
109 Id. at 264.
110 Id. at 265.
111 Id. ("Because the article did not indicate that the student's parents had been
offered an opportunity to respond to her allegation . .. there was cause for 'serious
doubt that the article complied with the rules of fairness which are standard in the
field of journalism .... .'").
Eighth Circuit reversed,112 reasoning that the newspaper could
not be censored absent evidence of (1) material or substantial
interference of school work or disciplinell3 or (2) interference
with the rights of others.1 14 Because there was no evidence that
the material would have been disruptive and because the articles
would not have exposed the school to tort liability, the Eighth
Circuit held that the students' First Amendment rights had been
violated.11
The United States Supreme Court reversed."' The
Kuhlmeier Court began its analysis by noting that Tinker
precludes students from being punished for expressing their
personal opinions at school "unless school authorities have
reason to believe that such expression will 'substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students."'1 17 The Court then cited Fraser for the proposition that
"[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its 'basic educational mission.""" But the Tinker and Fraser
rules are very different, and reading Fraser to permit schools to
punish speech that is inconsistent with their basic educational
mission, even if not employing lewd or indecent speech, accords
schools great deference.1 19
To make matters more confusing, the Court distinguished
between (1) the degree to which the First Amendment limits an
"educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that
happens to occur on the school premises, "120 and (2) the degree
to which the First Amendment limits "educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
112 Id. ("The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.") (citing Kuhlmeier v.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (1986)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 265.
115 Id. at 265-66.
116 Id.
117 Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
1 Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
11 See Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech
Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1282, 1303 (2008) (reading Fraserto accord "schools . . .
complete discretion to prohibit lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech"); R. George
Wright, Doubtful Threats and the Limits of Student Speech Rights, 42 U.C. DAvIS L. REv.
679, 710-11 (2009) ("Fraser has sometimes been interpreted broadly to encompass
any speech deemed inconsistent with the school's 'basic educational mission."').
120 Kuhlmeer, 484 U.S. at 271.
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public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."12 1 The Court reasoned:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control
over this second form of student expression to
assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that
the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.122
For example, "a school may in its capacity as publisher
of a school newspaper or producer of a school play 'disassociate
itself . . . from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."12 3 But
if what was at issue in Kuhlmeier (control over material that might
reasonably be attributed to the school) was qualitatively different
from what was at issue in Tinker (political speech) or Fraser (lewd
speech), then the broad reading of the Fraser test was dictum and
possibly misleading to include.
The Kuhlmeier Court believed that Tinker did not control
what was before it. "[T]he standard articulated in Tinker for
determining when a school may punish student expression need
not also be the standard for determining when a school may
refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression."1 2 4 That latter standard involved a different
test: "[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."12 5 Yet, if indeed Tinker is simply the wrong test, then
it is not clear why Tinker and Fraser were mentioned or how they
helped the analysis beyond making clear that neither provided
the relevant test 26 -neither of those decisions provided support
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
12 4 Id. at 272-73.
125 Id. at 273.
126 Shannon M. Raley, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet
Era, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 773, 780 (2011) ("Although the Kuhlmeier Court began its
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for the new standard for school-sponsored expression.12
The Court only added to the confusion when deciding
Morse v. Frederick.128 At issue was whether a student could be
punished for refusing to take down a banner at a school-
sponsored event.129 The Olympic Torch Relay was taking place
in Juneau, Alaska by a school while class was in session,13 0 and
the principal allowed the staff and students to participate in the
relay "as an approved social event or class trip."131 Basically,
student participation involved "leav[ing] class to observe the
relay from either side of the street."1 32
Frederick and his friends were observing the relay across
the street from the school.13 3 As the torchbearers and camera
crew went by, Frederick and his friends "unfurled a 14-foot
banner bearing the phrase: 'BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."'1 3 4 The
principal crossed the street and demanded that the banner be
taken down.13 5 All but Frederick complied.13 6 The principal
confiscated the banner and suspended him for 10 days,137
justifying the discipline by saying that the banner advocated
illegal drug use.138
analysis in a similar manner as both Tinker and Fraser, it distinguished itself from
both cases and ultimately created a new standard under which student speech may
be regulated."); Tabor, supra note 91, at 568 ("Having quoted extensively from Tinker
and from Fraser, the [Kuhlmeier] Court chose not to apply either.").
127 Kuhlmeter, 484 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not, for it
cannot, purport to discern from our precedents the distinction it creates."). Some
commentators fail to note the disconnect between Fraser and Kuhlmeter. See, e.g.,
Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech Cases
Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions-for the Law and for the Litigants, 63 FLA. L.
REv. 1407, 1427 (2011) ("The Kuhlmeier Court interpreted Fraser as allowing control
of speech in 'school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that . . . might reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the [school]
imprimatur."') (citations omitted).
128 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
129 Id. at 396 ("[T]he principal directed the students to take down the banner. One
student-among those who had brought the banner to the event-refused to do so.
The principal confiscated the banner and later suspended the student.").
130 Id. at 397 ("On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through
Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. The
torchbearers were to proceed along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School
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The Morse Court began its analysis by explaining why this
case qualified as a student expression case: the event occurred
during normal school hoursl39 and was sanctioned by the
principal as an approved social event or class trip,14 0 which made
it subject to school regulations.14 1 Teachers and administrators
were interspersed among the students and were supervising
them,142 and both cheerleaders and the high school band were
performing that day.143
After having established that this was student speech, the
Court analyzed the content of the expression, which admittedly
was "cryptic."14 4 Nonetheless, the Court believed it reasonable to
interpret the statement as advocating illegal drug use,145 and the
Court held that "[a] principal may, consistent with the First
Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that
speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use."14 6
In support of that holding, the Court reviewed the
existing jurisprudence, reading Tinker as holding that "student
expression may not be suppressed unless school officials
reasonably conclude that it will 'materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school."'14 7 The Court
treated armband wearing as "political speech,"148 and did not
discuss whether wearing the armband in December 1965149 might
be viewed as communicating support for those who illegally
undermined or interfered with the military draft."1o However, the
139 Id. at 400 ("The event occurred during normal school hours.").
140 Id. ("It was sanctioned by Principal Morse 'as an approved social event or class
trip' .... .").
141 See id 400-01 ("[T] he school district's rules expressly provide that pupils in
'approved social events and class trips are subject to district rules for student
conduct."') (citations omitted).
142 Id. at 401 ("Teachers and administrators were interspersed among the students
and charged with supervising them.").
143 Id. ("The high school band and cheerleaders performed.").
144 Id.
145 Id. ("Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those viewing it
as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.").
146 See id at 403.
147 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)).
148 Id.
149 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
15o Cf Josh Saunders, Ramsey Clark's Prosecution Complex How Did Lyndon Johnson's
Attorney General Come to Defend Dictators, War Criminals, and Terrorists?, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, Dec. 2003 at 42, 44 (" [I]n 1968, Clark oversaw the prosecution of the
pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, Yale chaplain William Sloane Coffin Jr., and three
Morse Court did not treat Frederick's speech as political, at least
in part, because he himself claimed that the message was
meaningless and was just a ploy to get on TV.1"' At the same
time, the Court was unwilling to credit Frederick's own
interpretation of his statement when characterizing it as in favor
of illegal drug use.152 But if the message was reasonably
interpreted by the Court to be promoting illegal drug use, then
the message was also reasonably interpreted to be commenting
on a social issue by virtue of its being an endorsement of
marijuana use.
According to the Court's own interpretation of Tinker,
Frederick's speech was protected unless (1) it was viewed as
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the work and
discipline of the school,"1 53 or (2) the doctrine had been changed
subsequent to Tinker.15 4 To justify that the doctrine had changed,
the Court offered an exposition of Fraser."'
The Court admitted that "[t]he mode of analysis
employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.""' While the Fraser
Court had focused upon the "offensively lewd and indecent
speech" at issue,15 7 it had also included language suggesting that
"school boards have the authority to determine 'what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate."" One interpretation of Fraser is that it simply
provided an exception to Tinker-as a general matter, student
other men accused of conspiring to undermine the Selective Service laws."). The
draft did not end until several years later. See Alex Dixon, July Marks 40th Anniversary
ofAll- VolunteerArmy, U.S. ARmY (July 2, 2013),
https://www.army.mil/article/ 106813/July marks 40th anniversary of all volunt
eer Army ("By July 1, 1973-now 40 years ago-the draft had been eliminated.").
151 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 ("Frederick himself claimed 'that the words were just
nonsense meant to attract television cameras."') (citing Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d
1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd and remanded, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), and vacated,
499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007)). See also id. at 403 ("But not even Frederick argues that
the banner conveys any sort of political or religious message.").
152 See id. at 402 ("The pro-drug interpretation of the banner gains further plausibility
given the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear. The best Frederick
can come up with is that the banner is 'meaningless and funny."') (quoting Frederick,
439 F.3d at 1116).
153 Id. at 403 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
154 See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
155 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05.
151 Id. at 404.
157 Id (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
151 Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
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speech is protected unless (1) materially and substantially
disrupting schooll59 or (2) the speech is itself "offensively lewd
and indecent."'6 0 But that interpretation would suggest that
Frederick's speech was protected, absent a showing of
disruption. Yet, there are other possible interpretations of Fraser,
for example, that school can prohibit lewd, indecent, or offensive
speech.' The latter interpretation would permit Frederick's
speech to be punished, assuming that it might reasonably be
found offensive. 16 2
The Court explained that it "need not resolve this debate
[about the best interpretation of Fraser] to decide this case"163 but
then eschewed the interpretation establishing that the Tinker
material disruption requirement applies unless the speech is lewd
or offensive.164 The Court reasoned that it was "enough to distill
from Fraser two basic principles:"' (1) "the constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings,"' and (2) that "the
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute."16 7
Here, the Court was simply wrong to believe that the two
distilled principles were enough to establish that Frederick's
speech could be punished. Tinker itself suggests that the
constitutional rights of students in schools are not coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.' Under Tinker,
students could have been punished for wearing armbands if
doing so was disruptive, whereas an adult's wearing an armband
in the public square would not be similarly treated.16 9 That
159 Id. at 403 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
160 Id. at 404 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
161 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
162 See Cf Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 ("The message on Frederick's banner is ... no doubt
offensive to some .....
16 3 d at 404.
164 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
15 Morse, 551 U.S. at 404.
166 Id. at 404-05 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682).
167 Id. at 405 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
16 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (holding that restricting student speech would be
appropriate upon "a showing that the students' activities would materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.").
16 Cf Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (striking down "permitting
scheme [as applied] to individuals like Parks, who may be speaking, wearing signs,
and/or leafletting, [because the scheme] unconstitutionally burdens free expression
in violation of the First Amendment.").
student speech rights are not coextensive with those of adults
does not establish that Frederick's speech was subject to
punishment. Further, if Fraser was recognizing an exception to
the Tinker analysis for lewd or indecent speech, then the Fraser
exception would not have been triggered in Morse and the Court
would have held the speech protected absent a showing of
disruption.
Basically, the Morse Court did resolve that Fraser should
not be read as a limited exception to Tinker.170 What remained
unresolved was just how broadly the current exception should be
read-does that exception only include lewd speech and speech
promoting illegal drug use,171 or is the exception broader than
that? The Court also pointed to Kuhimeier, noting that it
confirmed both that "schools may regulate some speech 'even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside
the school,"'17 2 and that "the rule of Tinker is not the only basis
for restricting student speech."17 3 While the Court admitted that
"Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would
reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's
imprimatur,"17 4 the Court implied that both Fraser and Kuhlmeier
left open how broadly the exception to Tinker should be read
rather than representing limited exceptions involving perceived
state endorsement or the use of sexually indecent language.175
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made clear his
view that Tinker was simply wrongly decided,17 6 which allegedly
was why the Court had felt the need to "set the standard aside
on an ad hoc basis."17 7 He read Fraser as announcing an
170 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 ("Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did
not conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed by Tinker.").
171 See id. at 407 ("[T]hese cases also recognize that deterring drug use by
schoolchildren is an 'important-indeed, perhaps compelling' interest.") (citing
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
172 Id. at 405-06 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988)).17 31 d at 406.
17 4 d at 405.
175 Id. at 405-06 ("[Like Fraser, [Kuhlmeter] confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the
only basis for restricting student speech.").
171 Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I write separately to state my view that the
standard set forth in Tinker . . . is without basis in the Constitution.").
177 Id. at 417 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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exception,1 78 Kuhlmeier as announcing a different exception,17 9
and Morse as announcing yet another exception."18 But he noted
that the Court has failed to "offer an explanation of when
[Tinker] operates and when it does not.""' In contrast, Justice
Alito implied that Tinker governs 8 2 unless certain limited
exceptions are triggered: (1) the speech is reasonably interpreted
to be advocating illegal drug use,18 3 (2) the speech is lewd or
vulgar,184 or (3) the speech "is in essence the school's own speech,
that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official
school organ."18
At the very least, the Court has left open many questions.
Should advocacy of illegal conduct not involving drugs be
subjected to a more protective standard?"' What constitutes a
substantial disruption? Under what conditions, if any, will
student speech undermining a school's mission be subject to
punishment?
Justice Alito in his concurrence joined the opinion "on
the understanding that . . . it provides no support for any
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on
issues such as 'the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
marijuana for medicinal use."'1 87 Yet, it is difficult to know what
to make of this caveat if only because an individual might at the
same time advocate illegal drug use and make a comment about
178 Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Signaling at least a partial break with Tinker,
Fraser left the regulation of indecent student speech to local schools.").
179 Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[I]n Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier . .
the Court made an exception to Tinker for school-sponsored activities.").
180 d. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Today, the Court creates another exception.").
181 d. (Thomas, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) ("I do not read the opinion to mean that there are
necessarily any grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized in the
holdings of this Court.").
183 Id. (Alito J., concurring) (" [T]he decision in the present case allows the restriction
of speech advocating illegal drug use.").
184 Id. (Alito J., concurring) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
185 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988)).
186 See id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" [P]unishing someone for advocating illegal
conduct is constitutional only when the advocacy is likely to provoke the harm that
the government seeks to avoid.") (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449
(1969)).
187 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
a current social issue.1"' Indeed, insofar as one wishes to impute
content to "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"1 89 rather than simply call it
nonsensical,1 90 one would presumably ascribe to the speaker a
positive attitude towards the use of marijuana, which would be
a comment on a social issue.191 If the reason that Frederick's
speech could be punished was that drug use can be
detrimental,1 92 then the same exception might swallow political
commentary on guns in schools, since gun "use presents a grave
and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of
students."193 The difficulty that Justice Alito allegedly wishes to
avoid, namely, that the "'educational mission' argument would
give public school authorities a license to suppress speech on
political and social issues based on disagreement with the
viewpoint expressed," 19 4 seems to infect his analysis. Many
issues of current concern might be said to involve unique dangers
or be inflammatory,19 5 which would justify their being subject to
punishment. Arguably, there are unique dangers implicated
when casting aspersions upon groups based upon race, religion,
nationality, immigration status, or sexual orientation or identity.
Discussions about political questions can be very divisive,
resulting in hurt feelings or lashing out. In short, the unique
danger exception may be so broad as to swallow the rule.
188 See id. at 426 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("But speech advocating change in drug laws
might also be perceived of as promoting the disregard of existing drug laws.").
189 Id. at 397.
190 See id. at 401. Cf Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir.
2007) ("This appeal presents the question of whether student speech that threatens a
Columbine-style attack on a school is protected by the First Amendment. Today we
follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393 (2007), and hold that it is not because such speech poses a direct threat to the
physical safety of the school population.").
191 See supra text accompanying note 155.
192 Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[D]rug use presents a grave and in
many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students.").
193 Id. (Alito, J., concurring). Cf Melanie E. Migliaccio, Don't Say "Gun": Is Censorship
of Student "Gun" Speech in Public Schools A Permissible Inculcation of Shared Community
Values or an Unconstitutional Establishment of Orthodoxy?, 8 LIBERTY U.L. REv. 751, 777
(2014) ("Political speech, like Jared's encouraging others to 'Protect Your [Second
Amendment] Right' and Michael's support of the military, would appear to be
protected under Tinker, but the First Amendment protection depends on how courts
choose to define the issue.").
194 Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).
195 See Arielle A. Dagen-Sunsdahl, Navigating Through Hills & Dales: Can Employers
Abide by the NLRA While Maintaining Civil Work Environments?, 31 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 363, 380 (2016) (discussing "topics that may be considered objectionable or
inflammatory, such as politics and religion").
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Justice Alito agreed that "public schools may ban speech
advocating illegal drug use."19 6 However, he deemed "such
regulation as standing at the far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits,"19 7 and he concurred based on "the
understanding that the opinion does not endorse any further
extension."198 Yet, the questions at hand included whether the
First Amendment permits banning such speech and, if so,
whether the First Amendment also permits banning other
speech, e.g., about other dangerous or illegal activities.
Justice Alito was unwilling to read Morse as "endors [ing]
the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United
States that the First Amendment permits public school officials
to censor any student speech that interferes with a school's
'educational mission."'19 9 But Morse is adding an additional
exception to those already recognized in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, so
the more pressing concern is whether Fraser recognized an
educational mission exception and how broadly Kuhlmeier's
school endorsement test can be read.
Justice Alito argued that the "'educational mission' . .
argument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways" and that
he "would reject it before such abuse occurs. "200 Some
commentators believe that he was thereby offering an important
limitation on Fraser.20 1 But whether this was a significant
limitation on Fraser depends a great deal upon what he would
consider an abuse. It seems plausible to believe that he has
particular kinds of expression in mind that he would not want to
be limited, such as the expression of student views that
196 Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
197 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
198 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).
200 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
201 Nuttall, supra note 122, at 1310 ("Justice Alito's concurrence may take this overly
lenient justification off the table."); Jeremiah Galus, Bong Hits 4 Jesus: Student Speech
and the "Educational Mission"Argument After Morse v. Frederick, 71 U. PITT. L. REv.
143, 144 (2009) ("Justice Alito's concurring opinion rejects the propriety of extending
Fraser and Kuhlmeer's exceptions to Tinker to include student speech contrary to the
school's educational mission.").
denigrate20 2 sexual minorities20 3 -Justice Alito likely wants to
prevent certain religious viewpoints from being subject to
punishment.204 But it is of course true that the sincere
representation of religious beliefs can make some students feel
unwelcome and impair their ability to learn.2 05 Justice Alito's
fears that standards might easily be manipulated is well-
illustrated by the Court's own interpretation of "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS." Assuming that the expression is not simply nonsense,
the difficulty posed for the Court is in its apparent willingness to
accept that the expression may reasonably be interpreted as
support for illegal drug use but not as general support for
marijuana use and not that drug use may help one feel closer to
(one's) God. These latter interpretations would have made the
sign protected as comments on social, political, or religious
matters. In short, the Court has announced a standard under
Tinker but has created possibly large exceptions under Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse without offering any useful way to cabin
those exceptions.
II. THE CIRCUITs TRY TO FOLLOW THE COURT'S LEAD
The Court has made clear that student speech rights are
not absolute, so school and courts can be confident that
punishing students for their speech in some circumstances is
constitutionally permissible.2 0 6 Regrettably, the Court has spelled
out the contours of the exceptions so poorly that it is difficult to
202 Francisco M. Negr6n, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards A 'New"
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REv.
1221, 1235 (2009) ("Surely derogatory speech targeting members of minority groups,
identified by race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation not only interferes with
that mission, but can also be said to infringe on the rights of students to learn in an
environment free of harassment.").
203 Cf Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students'Potentially Hutful
Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 488 (2008) ("[Tlhere was much
in the majority opinion and Justice Alito's concurrence to please religious advocacy
groups.").
204 Cf Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the
Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 723-24 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen
Hastings refused to register CLS, it claimed that the CLS bylaws impermissibly
discriminated on the basis ofreligion and sexual orientation. As interpreted by Hastings
and applied to CLS, both ofthese grounds constituted viewpoint discrimination.")
(emphasis added).
205 Id. at 688 (majority opinion).
206 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403-04 (2007).
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know what is permissibly punished and what is not. The circuits
have been trying to fill in the gaps, which unsurprisingly has
resulted in differing and incompatible doctrines.
A. Threatening Speech
Bell v. Itawamba County School Board 7 illustrates the
difficulties in applying the substantial disruption rule. Taylor Bell
posted a rap recording on the internet, which contained
threatening language against two high school coaches. 20 8 The
Fifth Circuit framed the question as whether the Tinker
substantial disruption exception might be triggered by "off-
campus speech directed intentionally at the school community
and reasonably understood by school officials to be threatening,
harassing, and intimidating to a teacher." 20 9 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the constitutionality of the discipline imposed,
reasoning that the Tinker substantial disruption standard had
been met.2 10
First, Bell's expression was reasonably thought
threatening-he said that he was going to hit a particular
individual with a pistol or put a pistol down that individual's
throat.21 1 While Bell may have had no intention of committing
any violent behavior,212 one of the targeted individuals testified
that he felt threatened.2 13
True threats are not protected by the First Amendment,2 1 4
and the person making a threat need not intend to carry it out in
order to be found to have made a threat. 2 15 The Fifth Circuit held
that the speech was threatening, which alone sufficed to establish
207 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
208 Id. at 383 ("Taylor Bell, a student at Itawamba Agricultural High School in
Itawamba County, Mississippi, posted a rap recording containing threatening
language against two high school teachers/coaches on the Internet.").
209 Id.
210 See id (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
2 11 See id at 384.
212 Id. at 386. ("[H]e did not think the coaches would hear the recording and did not
intend it to be a threat.")
213 Id. at 388 ("Coach W. testified he: interpreted the statements in the rap recording
literally, after hearing it on a student's smartphone at school; was 'scared."').
214 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("[T]he First Amendment also
permits a State to ban a 'true threat."') (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969)).
215 Id. at 359-60 ("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.").
that the First Amendment did not protect it.216 However, the
Fifth Circuit refused to base its decision on Bell's having made a
true threat,217 instead applying Tinker to "speech which
originated, and was disseminated, off-campus, without the use
of school resources." 2 18
The desire to reach such speech is understandable. The
court explained that the existence of "the Internet, cellphones,
smartphones, and digital social media"219 and the "sweeping
adoption [of technology] by students present new and evolving
challenges for school administrators, confounding previously
delineated boundaries of permissible regulations. "220 Because of
these new technologies, "[s]tudents now have the ability to
disseminate instantaneously and communicate widely from any
location via the Internet" 221  and, further, "[t]hese
communications, which may reference events occurring, or to
occur, at school, or be about members of the school community,
can likewise be accessed anywhere, by anyone, at any time." 2 2 2
An additional and important consideration "is the recent
rise in incidents of violence against school communities." 2 2 3
School authorities must "take seriously any statements by
students resembling threats of violence" 224 to avoid "[t]his now-
tragically common violence." 2 25 There is a "paramount need for
school officials to be able to react quickly and efficiently to
protect students and faculty from threats, intimidation, and
harassment intentionally directed at the school community." 2 2 6
The importance of protecting schools cannot be gainsaid.
216 Bell, 799 F.3d at 400 (noting that the "high-school student ... direct[ed] speech at
the school community which threaten[ed], harasse[d], and intimidate[d] teachers").
217 Id. at 400 ("In considering Bell's First Amendment claim, and our having affirmed
summary judgment for the school board under Tinker, it is unnecessary to decide
whether Bell's speech also constitutes a 'true threat."').2 1 81 d at 393.




2 2 31 d at 393.
224 Id. (citing Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2007)).
225 Id.
2 26 Id. See also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013)
("With the advent of the Internet and in the wake of school shootings at Columbine,
Santee, Newtown and many others, school administrators face the daunting task of
evaluating potential threats of violence and keeping their students safe without
impinging on their constitutional rights.").
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The surprising aspect of the Bell reasoning was not its
emphasis on the importance of protecting students and school
personnel but the circuit's limitation on the speech that could be
punished. The court explained that a school cannot reach threats
unless the speaker intends that his speech reach the school
community. 2 27 Thus, a student who makes credible threats
against school personnel cannot be punished by the school unless
he intentionally caused those threats to reach students or school
personnel. 228 But given the rise in actual violence and the lives
that have been lost in school massacres, it is surprising that
credible threats that come to light as a result of the (potential)
perpetrator's negligence are nonetheless immune from school
punishment.
Tinker suggests that students have First Amendment
rights even after they have walked through the schoolhouse
gate. 2 29 But true threats are not protected whether made in or
outside of school and whether made by minors or adults, 230 So it
is not as if Tinker would protect such statements unless
substantially disruptive.23 1 While a separate issue is whether
schools should be able to reach speech made off-campus as a
matter of policy, the First Amendment does not impose those
limitations when true threats are involved.2 32
The issue of intent was not problematic in Bell, because
he wanted the school community to become aware of his rap to
increase awareness of what he believed was wrongdoing by the
coaches.2 33 Because that was his intent, the court was not
227 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 395.
228 Even a slightly more forgiving standard does not seem appropriate in this context.
See, e.g., Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students'Rights: The Need for an
Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off Campus Student Internet Speech, 36
CAP. U. L. REv. 129, 132 (2007) ("[Tjhe Tinker standard of material and substantial
disruption should only be applied to off-campus Internet speech when the student
knowingly or recklessly distributes the speech on-campus.").
229 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
230 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see supra text accompanying note
217.
231 Cf Laura Prieston, Parents, Students, and the Pledge of Allegiance: Why Courts Must
Protect the Marketplace of Student Ideas, 52 B.C. L. REv. 375, 381 (2011) ("Although
Tinker was protective of students' First Amendment rights, the Court has since made
clear that student speech rights are not 'coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings."') (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
232 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 ("[T]he First Amendment also permits a State to ban a
'true threat."') (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
233 Bellv. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015).
precluded from examining whether the speech had or was likely
to cause a disruption.2 34 Unsurprisingly, the circuit court found
that "the school board reasonably could have forecast a
substantial disruption at school, based on the threatening,
intimidating, and harassing language in Bell's rap recording."235
Further, there was evidence that school had been disrupted-
both coaches who were the subjects of the video claimed that
they had changed how they worked as a result of it.236 (A separate
question was whether the coaches should have modified how
they acted at school.2 37 )
Similarly, in Wynar v. Douglas County School District,23 8 the
Ninth Circuit held that a student's off-campus, threatening
message could be punished.23 9 In that case, a student at Douglas
High School sent from his home "a string of increasingly violent
and threatening instant messages . . . to his friends bragging
about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates,
intimating that he would 'take out' other people at a school
shooting on a specific date."24 0 The Ninth Circuit explained that
the "messages presented a real risk of significant disruption to
school activities and interfered with the rights of other
students."24 1 The "school authorities . . . temporarily expelled
Landon based in large part on these instant messages."242
The Ninth Circuit was reluctant to attempt "to divine and
impose a global standard for a myriad of circumstances involving
He admitted during the disciplinary-committee hearing that one
of the purposes for producing the recording was to "increase
awareness of the [alleged misconduct]" and that, by posting the
rap recording on Facebook and YouTube, he knew people were
"gonna listen to it, somebody's gonna listen to it," remarking that
"students all have Facebook."
234 Id. at 397 ("Having held Tinker applies in this instance, the next question is
whether Bell's recording either caused an actual disruption or reasonably could be
forecast to cause one.").
2351d. at 400.
236 Id. at 388 ("Both coaches identified in the rap recording testified that it adversely
affected their work at the school.").
237 See id. at 387 ("At the 10 March hearing for the requested injunction, Bell
presented four affidavits from students at his school concerning alleged misconduct
by the coaches.").
238 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
239 Id. at 1062.
240 Id. at 1064-65.
241 Id. at 1065.
242 Id.
20171 TINKER REMORSE 29
30 FIRSTAMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
off-campus speech."2 4 3 The court noted that a "student's
profanity-laced parody of a principal is hardly the same as a
threat of a school shooting,"2 44 and reasoned that "the subject
and addressees of Landon's messages [make it] . . . hard to
imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more
direct."24 5 Further, precisely because specific individuals were
being threatened with violence, "it should have been reasonably
foreseeable to Landon that his messages would reach
campus."2 46 Here, too, the student claimed to have been
joking.24 7 Others were not so sure. For example, one student's
father refused to allow that student to attend school on any day
that the threatening student was also in attendance.2 4 8
Rather than impose the Third Circuit requirement that
the threatening speech be intended to reach individuals at the
school, the Ninth Circuit merely required that it be foreseeable
that such information would be communicated.2 4 9 Given that
school attacks occupy such a prominent place in the public mind,
it would be foreseeable that school personnel would be alerted
were an individual to make threats, so the Ninth Circuit standard
would be rather easily met.
The Eighth Circuit analyzed a school threat case in
D.iM ex rel. D.M v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60,250
which involved a student who sent threatening messages from
his computer to other students at home.25 1 He was suspended for
several months,2 52 and his parents alleged inter alia a First




247 Id. at 1071 ("We need not discredit Landon's insistence that he was joking .....
248 Id. ("One female student who was mentioned in Landon's MySpace messages
reported that she was afraid of Landon and that her father would not let her return to
school if Landon was there.").
249 See generally id.
250 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
251 Id. at 757 ("After school D.J.M. would type messages into his home computer's
instant messaging program and then send them in real time to a friend's home
computer. His friends would then type messages back.").
252 Id. at 759 ("On October 31, one week after D.J.M. had been placed in juvenile
detention, Powell and assistant principal Ryan Sharkey decided to suspend him for
ten days. Then on November 3, Superintendent Janes extended the suspension for
the rest of the school year .... ).
Amendment violation.2 53 The district court "held that D.J.M.'s
speech had been an unprotected true threat and alternatively that
the District could properly discipline him for his speech because
of its disruptive impact on the school environment."2 5 4
The Eighth Circuit discussed both the approach involving
true threats and the approach involving the Tinker substantial
disruption prong.25 5 Notwithstanding D.J.M.'s claim that he had
been joking2 56 and that he had intended no harm,257 the Eighth
Circuit upheld the reasonableness of the District's classifying his
speech as a true threat.25 8 The Eighth Circuit also upheld that
alternative finding that the speech could be punished under the
Tinker substantial disruption prong.2 59
Even if D.J.M. had meant no harm, it was quite
reasonable to take his threats seriously, which meant that there
was sufficient basis for a true threat finding.260 Further, the school
authorities took additional safety measures in response,26 1 so it
was reasonable to believe that there had been substantial
disruption. Nonetheless, it would be helpful for the disruption
standard to be more fully developed. The difficulty will not be in
figuring out the necessary amount of actual or reasonably
anticipated disruption to meet the standard in this kind of case,
i.e., where a true threat has been made, because that expression
is not protected anyway.26 Rather, it will be necessary to figure
253 Id. ("D.J.M.'s parents subsequently brought this action in Missouri circuit court,
alleging that his suspension had violated his First Amendment right to free speech . .
2 5 4 
-d at 760.
255 Id. at 761 ("[T]he courts of appeal have taken differing approaches in resolving
them. One line of cases centers on the concept of 'true threats' derived from Watts v.
United States . . . . The other line focuses on the substantial disruption issue
identified in Tinker.") (citation omitted).
256 Id. at 762 ("He asserts that his instant messages were made in jest . . .
257 Id. at 760 ("He asserts that he had not intended to make any true threats and that
his messages were not serious expressions of intent to harm.").
2581d. at 764 ("[H]ere the District was given enough information that it reasonably
feared D.J.M. had access to a handgun and was thinking about shooting specific
classmates at the high school.").
259 Id. at 766 ("Here, it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.'s threats about
shooting specific students in school would be brought to the attention of school
authorities and create a risk of substantial disruption within the school
environment.").
260 See id at 762 (noting that since D.J.M. "intentionally communicated his threats
to.. .a third party.. they were "true threats.").
261 Id. at 766.
262 Id. at 764.
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out the quantum of disruption required for other kinds of cases
where the expression itself would normally be protected by the
First Amendment.
B. Bullying
An increasing concern in schools is to prevent bullying,
and one issue involves the extent to which schools can reach off-
campus bullying. 263 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools264 involved
a student who had created a "MySpace.com webpage called
'S.A.S.H.,' . . . ['Students Against Sluts Herpes'],... which was
largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student." 26 5 The webpage
creator was suspended,26 6 which also meant that she was
"prevented from crowning the next 'Queen of Charm' in that
year's Charm Review, having been elected 'Queen' herself the
previous year." 267 Kara Kowalski was found to have violated the
school's harassment policy. 268
Kowalski sued, alleging violation of state and federal
guarantees.2 6 9 One of her claims was that the school could not
reach her out-of-school speech. 270  The Fourth Circuit
characterized the relevant question as "whether Kowalski's
activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school's
263 See Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier ofFree Speech, 42 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 765, 814 (2015) ("The nagging question is what schools may do about
off campus bullying that stops short of threats of violence, but where the potential for
severe emotional distress among teenagers deserves considerable public concern.").
264 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
2 6 5 d at 567.
266 Id. at 569 ("For punishment, they suspended Kowalski from school for 10 days
and issued her a 90-day 'social suspension,' which prevented her from attending
school events in which she was not a direct participant.").
267 Id.
268 Id. at 568-69 ("School administrators concluded that Kowalski had created a 'hate
website,' in violation of the school policy against 'harassment, bullying, and
intimidation."').
2 6 91 d at 570.
[Kowalski alleged] free speech violations under the First
Amendment, due process violations under the Fifth Amendment
(which Kowalski has acknowledged should have been under the
Fourteenth Amendment), cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, and equal protection violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint also alleged violations of
corresponding provisions of the West Virginia Constitution and a
state law claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
270 Id. at 570-71 ("She argues that because this case involved 'off-campus, non-school
related speech,' school administrators had no power to discipline her.").
legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and
protecting the well-being and educational rights of its
students."271
The Kowalski court recognized that student "rights are not
coextensive with those of adults,"272 and that "school
administrators have some latitude in regulating student speech
to further educational objectives."27 3 The court further noted
some of the dangers of bullying-"student-on-student bullying is
a 'major concern' in schools across the country and can cause
victims to become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to
school, and to have thoughts of suicide." 274 The court was
confident that this was the kind of conduct that met the Tinker
standard.27 5 Indeed, the court might also have emphasized
Tinker's discussion of conduct that "colli[des] with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone."2 76 The Kowalski
court cited this passage,277 but focused on the disturbance
aspect278 rather than on the right to be left in peace.
When justifying the school's reaching this conduct, the
Kowalski court admitted that the creation of the offensive
webpage occurred at Kowalski's home-"Kowalski indeed
pushed her computer's keys in her home."2 79 However, the
Fourth Circuit noted that it was reasonable to believe that the
effects would be broader than that-"she knew that the
electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond
her home and could reasonably be expected to reach the school
or impact the school environment."2 8 0 While the connection to
2 71 d at 571.
272 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
273 Id.
274 d at 572 (citing Warning Signs, STOPBULLYING.GOV,
https://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/warning-signs/index.html) (last visited Nov.
18, 2016)).
275 Id. ("We are confident that Kowalski's speech caused the interference and
disruption described in Tinker as being immune from First Amendment protection.").
276 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (according to Tinker, such rights hinder the work of
schools or other students).
277 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
278 See id. at 573-74 (noting that Kowalski's posts caused school disturbance because
they targeted another student, regardless of the fact that the posts were made outside
school grounds).2 7 91 d at 573.
280 Id.
20171 TINKER REMORSE 33
34 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
the school would have been stronger "had Kowalski created the
'S.A.S.H.' group during school hours, using a school-provided
computer and Internet connection,"2 8 1 the court reasoned that
the District "was authorized by Tinker to discipline Kowalski,
regardless of where her speech originated, because the speech
was materially and substantially disruptive in that it ' interfer [ed]
. . . with the schools' work [and] colli[ded] with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone." 2 82
The court rightly noted that "such harassment and
bullying is inappropriate and hurtful and that it must be taken
seriously by school administrators in order to preserve an
appropriate pedagogical environment. "283 Yet, it was not at all
clear that Kowalski's speech had First Amendment protection in
any event. "The webpage contained comments accusing Shay N.
of having herpes and being a 'slut,' as well as photographs
reinforcing those defamatory accusations. "284 Neither adults nor
students are immunized by the First Amendment for their
defamatory expression, and the Tinker substantial disruption test
would not need to be met in order to punish speech which itself
was unprotected.285
C. Other Expression
One difficulty posed for the jurisprudence is in how to
prevent a weak substantial disruption exception from swallowing
whatever protections Tinker is supposed to provide.2 86 Consider
Doninger v. Niehoff8 7 in which a student urged other students at
her high school to contact school officials to complain about the
281 Id.
282 Id. at 573-74 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
283 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577.
2 8 4 d at 573.
285 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(explaining the substantial disruption test and its application for regulating First
Amendment Protected speech that may substantially disrupt school activities, order,
or premises. The court held unconstitutional a suspension issued to students wearing
non-disruptive arm bands expressing disapproval of the Vietnam War).
286 Cf Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 693 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see supra text accompanying note 87 (noting how the school policy at issue in Fraser
defined obscene language as substantially disruptive, regardless of the speech's actual
or probable effects).
287 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
rescheduling or cancellation of a school event.288 Avery
Doninger posted the following on a publicly accessible website
unaffiliated with her school:289
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central
office. here is an email that we sent to a ton of
people and asked them to forward to everyone in
their address book to help get support for jamfest.
basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz
is getting a TON of phone calls and emails and
such. we have so much support and we really
appriciate [sic] it. however, she got pissed off and
decided to just cancel the whole thing all together.
anddd [sic] so basically we aren't going to have it
at all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going
to be after the talent show on may 18th. andd [sic]
..here is the letter we sent out to parents.2 90
As the Second Circuit pointed out, the posting contained
language that some might find offensive.29 1 The court was
satisfied that if Avery's speech had occurred on campus, it would
be subject to punishment under Fraser.292 But the court then
distanced itself from applying Fraser, because "[i] t is not clear. .
. that Fraser applies to off-campus speech."29 3 Instead, the court
upheld the school's punishment-prohibiting Avery from being
Senior Class Secretary-based on Tinker's substantial disruption
exception.294
288 Id at 43.
289 Id. at 45 ("Avery posted a message on her publicly accessible blog, which was
hosted by livejournal.com, a website unaffiliated with LMHS.").
290 Id.
291 Id. at 49 ("We need not conclusively determine Fraser's scope, however, to be
satisfied that Avery's posting-in which she called school administrators
'douchebags' and encouraged others to contact Schwartz 'to piss her off more'-
contained the sort of language that properly may be prohibited in schools.") (citing
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675).
292 Id. ("Avery's language, had it occurred in the classroom, would have fallen within
Fraser and its recognition that nothing in the First Amendment prohibits school
authorities from discouraging inappropriate language in the school environment.").
293 Id. See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d
Cir. 2011) ("Fraser's 'lewdness' standard cannot be extended to justify a school's
punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside the school, during non-school
hours.").
294 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50 ("[T]he Tinker standard has been adequately established
here."); see also id. at 53 ("We decide only that based on the existing record, Avery's
post created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and discipline of
the school and that Doninger has thus failed to show clearly that Avery's First
Amendment rights were violated when she was disqualified from running for Senior
Class Secretary.").
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Basically, many students complained to the
administration.2 95 Further, the way that Avery induced students
to complain-by calling the administration "douchebags" and
suggesting that it would be a good idea to "piss [them] off
more"2 96 -itself contributed to the problem because employing
such terms was "hardly conducive to cooperative conflict
resolution."297
Certainly, it was annoying and disruptive to have the
phone ringing off the hook. Nonetheless, if causing a school to
be inundated with calls meets the substantial disruption test, then
a whole host of messages posted online might meet that
standard, e.g., one accurately suggesting that the time or location
of a school event had changed. Perhaps the individual would not
have had all of the information so interested individuals would
call the school to find out more. Or, even if all of the information
had been supplied, many individuals might still call to confirm.
Other kinds of postings that would cause the school to be
inundated with calls are not difficult to imagine, e.g., that
ambulances, fire trucks, or police cars had been summoned to
the school. But the truthful posting of such information would
not seem appropriately punished, even if resulting in the phone
lines being tied up for an extended period.
The Second Circuit was likely trying to cabin the reach of
its analysis by noting that Doninger's language might be found
offensive and that her choice of words might have exacerbated
the problem.29 8 But it is not clear how these factors affected
whether the relevant quantum of actual or anticipated disruption
had been reached. An accurate and politely worded message
might yield the same number of calls and might be equally
disruptive, which suggests at the very least that the substantial
disruption exception requires some fine-tuning.
Some posted messages, while not threatening,
295 Id. at 51 ("Schwartz and Niehoff had received a deluge of calls and emails,
causing both to miss or be late to school-related activities.") (citing Doninger v.
Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007), afd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008)).
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
nonetheless disrupted school functioning in various ways.29 9 The
Third Circuit addressed the proper application of Tinker when
vulgar expression was used in an online posting.3 00 J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District30 1 concerned the suspension
of a middle school student who had "create[ed] on a weekend
and on her home computer, a MySpace profile (the "profile")
making fun of her middle school principal, James
McGonigle."30 2 The profile "contained adult language and
sexually explicit content[,]" 30 3 including "profanity and shameful
personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family."3 04
However, the characterization was "so outrageous that no one
took its content seriously[,]" 3 0 5 and J.S. testified that she thought
the profile "'comical' insofar as it was so 'outrageous.'"306
The court noted that the "District's computers block
access to MySpace, so no Blue Mountain student was ever able
to view the profile from school[,]" 30 7 although the court did not
discuss whether students could access MySpace from their
smartphones while at school. Further, students did discuss the
profile at school,3 " and one of the teachers reported that the
profile caused a disruption in his class.309
The Third Circuit assumed for purposes of the opinion
that Tinker applied.3 10 However, the court explained that "[t]here
is no dispute that J.S.'s speech did not cause a substantial
299 See, e.g, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922-23 (3d
Cir. 2011) (discussing how a fake social media profile created by a student about her
principal led to students "discussing the profile in class" over a span of several days
and prevented a school guidance counselor from performing various job functions, as
her presence was needed in the meeting with the offending student).
300 See, e.g., id. at 931-33 (holding that neither Tinker, nor any of its exceptions, apply
to off-campus speech, regardless of how "lewd, vulgar, and offensive" it is) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
301 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).302 Id. at 920.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 921.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 922 ("McGonigle was approached by two teachers who informed him that
students were discussing the profile in class.").
309 Id. ("Randy Nunemacher, a Middle School math teacher, experienced a
disruption in his class when six or seven students were talking and discussing the
profile; Nunemacher had to tell the students to stop talking three times, and raised
his voice on the third occasion.").
310 Id. at 926 ("[W]e will assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to J.S.'s
speech in this case.").
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disruption in the school."3 11 Further, the Third Circuit concluded
that "[t]he facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a
forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable."3 12 After all,
"J.S. did not even intend for the speech to reach the school-in
fact, she took specific steps to make the profile 'private' so that
only her friends could access it."3 13 Of course, her friends went
to the school, but "[t]he fact that her friends happen to be Blue
Mountain Middle School students is not surprising, and does not
mean that J.S.'s speech targeted the school."31 4 Yet, because her
school friends had access to the webpage, it was foreseeable that
other students and the principal would be made aware of its
existence. Precisely because J.S. was focusing on the principal of
the school, it was foreseeable that he would react once he became
apprised of the website's existence. Indeed, the duties of school
personnel were temporarily modified as a result of the webpage
coming to light.315 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit reasoned,
"McGonigle's response to the profile exacerbated rather than
contained the disruption in the school,"316 which means that the
reactions of a person subject to the attack could not in this case
be attributed to the website creator as the basis for suggesting that
she had caused a substantial disruption.
The district court had characterized the profile as "an
attack on the school's principal . .. [which] makes him out to be
a pedophile and sex addict."3 17 Suppose that the principal's
conduct had changed thereafter, e.g., if he had refused to deal
with students personally because he had feared that he would
wrongly be inferred to be making sexual advances to those
students. One can infer that the Third Circuit would attribute
311 Id. at 928.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 930.
3 14 Id. at 930-31.
315 Id. at 923 ("Frain canceled a small number of student counseling appointments to
supervise student testing on the morning that McGonigle met with J.S., K.L., and
their parents. Counselor Guers was originally scheduled to supervise the student
testing, but was asked by McGonigle to sit in on the meetings, so Frain filled in for
Guers.").3 16 Id at 931.
317 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07CV585, 2008 WL
4279517, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), afdon othergrounds, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir.
2010), reh'gen banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 9, 2010), on reh'g en banc, 650 F.3d
915 (3d Cir. 2011), and afd inpart, rev'd inpart, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
that change in behavior to the principal rather than J.S., although
other circuits would likely say that this change would go to
establishing that there had been a substantial disruption. For
example, the Bell court had noted that the coaches accused online
of inappropriate relations with female students had modified
how they dealt with students in response to the accusation, and
those modifications contributed to the finding of a substantial
disruption.3 18
Just as the federal courts are not in agreement about
which school disruptions are attributable to students for purposes
of meeting the Tinker disruption exception, courts cannot agree
about which expressions are vulgar under Fraser. Consider B.H.
ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District,319 which involved "two
middle-school students [who] purchased bracelets bearing the
slogan 'I V boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)' as part of a nationally
recognized breast-cancer-awareness campaign."3 20 The students
wore the bracelets to school.32 1 Some of the teachers objected,
e.g., because wearing the bracelets might be thought to
"trivialize[] breast cancer,"32 2 while others worried that wearing
the bracelets might encourage inappropriate behavior.32 3 That
said, there were no reports of inappropriate behavior that could
be attributed to the bracelets.3 24
The students wore their bracelets on Breast Cancer
Awareness Day3 25 and refused to remove them when a security
guard directed them to do so.326 Hearing that exchange, another
318 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 388 (5th Cir. 2015); see also supra
text accompanying note 239.
319 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013).32 0 d at 297-98.
321 Id. at 299 ("B.H., K.M., and three other students wore the 'I V boobies! (KEEP A
BREAST)' bracelets at Easton Area Middle School during the 2010[-]2011 school
year.").
322 Id.
323 Id. ("Others feared that the bracelets might lead to offensive comments or invite
inappropriate touching.").
324 Id. (" [T]here were no reports that the bracelets had caused any in-school
disruptions or inappropriate comments.").
325 Id. at 300 ("The following day, B.H. and K.M. each wore their 'I V boobies!
(KEEP A BREAST)' bracelets to observe the Middle School's Breast Cancer
Awareness Day.").
326 Id. ("[B] oth girls were instructed by a school security guard to remove their
bracelets. Both girls refused.").
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student stood up and refused to remove her bracelet.327 The girls
were again asked to remove the bracelets later.328 Those refusing
to do so were punished.3 29 At least one question is whether the
bracelets should be considered vulgar and thus subject to the
Fraser exception.33 0
The B.H court characterized Fraser as holding that "lewd,
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive student speech is
categorically unprotected in school, even if it falls short of
obscenity and would have been protected outside school."33 1
According to the court, this meant that "schools may also
categorically restrict ambiguous speech that a reasonable
observer could interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or
offensive." 332 However, "[a] school's leeway to categorically
restrict ambiguously lewd speech . . . ends when that speech
could also plausibly be interpreted as expressing a view on a
political or social issue.""3
The Third Circuit interpreted Justice Alito's Morse
concurrence as protecting "political or social speech reasonably
interpreted to advocate illegal drug use,"3 3 4 although the court
did not discuss why "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" could not be
reasonably construed as commenting about a social issue by
expressing support for possibly illegal drug use."' In dissent,
Judge Hardiman argued that the majority's "limitation on the
ability of schools to regulate student speech that could
reasonably be deemed lewd, vulgar, plainly offensive, or
constituting sexual innuendo finds no support in Fraser or its
327 Id. ("Hearing this encounter, another girl, R.T., stood up and similarly refused to
take off her bracelet.").
328 Id. ("Braxmeier spoke to all three girls, and R.T. agreed to remove her bracelet.
B.H. and K.M. stood firm, however, citing their rights to freedom of speech.").
32 9 1d. ("The Middle School administrators ... punished B.H. and K.M. by giving
each of them one and a half days of in-school suspension and by forbidding them
from attending the Winter Ball.").
330 Id. at 302 ("The School District defends the bracelet ban as an exercise of its
authority to restrict lewd, vulgar, profane, or plainly offensive student speech under
Fraser.").
331 Id. at 305 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir.
2001)).
332 Id. at 308.
333 Id. at 309.
334 Id. at 313.
335 Butsee id. at 339-40 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen would a student using a
term that is admittedly ambiguous not be able to assert that the use of the offending
word, term, or phrase is speech that is commenting on a political or social issue?").
progeny."33 He suggested that it was "objectively reasonable to
interpret the bracelets, in the middle school context, as
inappropriate sexual innuendo and double entendre."33 7
Regrettably, the Court has provided no helpful guidance about
which speech can be classified as vulgar or about whether
allegedly vulgar speech is immunized if commenting on a social
issue, although it bears repeating that the Fraser speech was in the
context of endorsing someone for a school office,33 so it seems
unlikely that comments on political or social issues are
immunized as a general matter.
CONCLUSION
Student speech rights are constitutionally protected,
subject to certain exceptions. But the Court's description and
application of these exceptions has been so loose that in many
cases they can simply swallow up whatever protections exist.
Further, the Court has been utterly unhelpful with respect to how
or when to differentiate among the kinds of speech that pose
genuine dangers to students and school personnel versus
sophomoric speech that, while inappropriate, poses no dangers
to anyone. Difficult issues involving the Tinker disruption
exception, e.g., when to attribute to the speaker the foreseeable
reactions to the speech, are simply left to the circuits to decide.
Advances in technological capability coupled with an
increase in school violence have made the Court's guidance in
this area all the more essential. Regrettably, the Court has instead
offered contradictory comments resulting in circuit splits on
matters that might literally involve life and death. The Court
must at its earliest opportunity offer some helpful guidance on
how to reconcile important free speech concerns with school
functioning and safety so that the circuits do not continue to
diverge on how to handle these matters of paramount
336 Id. at 325 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
337 Id. at 335 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). See also J.A. v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 2013
WL 4479229, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2013) (agreeing that "a bracelet bearing the
slogan 'I V boobies (Keep a Breast)" might reasonably be thought lewd and vulgar).
338 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986); see supra text
accompanying note 56.
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importance.
